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Speculative realists claim that phenomenologists cannot address other 
entities in the more-than-human world on their own terms because 
phenomenology is paradigmatically correlationist. The standard charge of 
correlationism holds that because the phenomenological subject actively 
structures its entire experience, phenomenology effectively reduces the 
world to a correlate for the subject, rather than addressing the world as it 
exists beyond, or before the (human) subject. Since, under correlationism, 
worldly entities are purportedly revealed in a manner non-accidentally 
related to their place in an anthropocentric schema, correlationism allegedly 
leads to unpalatable conclusions (e.g. technoscientific instrumentalism, 
large-scale environmental degradation caused by rampant consumerism, 
exclusionary anthropocentric politics) for the more-than-human world (see 
e.g. Morton “Everything”). In this paper, I will address the charge of 
correlationism against Merleau-Pontian phenomenology in two steps. 
Firstly, I intend to show that although Merleau-Pontian phenomenologists 
must court something like correlationism, this is because of a well-justified 
desire to retain the alterity of other parties revealed in experience, serious 
engagement with which requires addressing the situated body-subject’s 
irreducible contribution to the character of any world taken up. Secondly, I 
intend to problematize the claim that this sort of admission necessarily 
makes Merleau-Pontian phenomenology correlationist, at least in any 
problematic sense. On my account, any serious version of the correlationist 
charge is misdirected because Merleau-Pontians deny the ontological 
primacy of the poles between which correlational “access” is said to occur. 
Ultimately, I hope to show that by reinstating the centrality of the body to 
phenomenological investigation, and thus facilitating a chiasmic epistemic 
relationship between body-subject and world, a radically-reflective 
phenomenology of a Merleau-Pontian ilk can nullify the problems 
supposedly introduced by correlationism even if, at some level of 
description, the charge may be true. 
 
 





Speculative realism is widely recognized to be a diverse movement united 
only by its formal rejection of correlationism and the desire to overcome it 
in one way or another (Sparrow 115; Shaviro 65). So, what exactly is 
correlationism? 
In a statement more-or-less echoed by all speculative realists, 
Quentin Meillassoux holds that “by ‘correlation’ we mean the idea 
according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between 
thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the 
other.” Since the correlation is “unsurpassable. … Correlationism consists 
in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realms of 
subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another” (5). 
Phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty resist cleaving epistemology from 
ontology because one’s phenomenological opening is the only means of 
establishing any such ontology. However, as Merleau-Ponty argues, any 
phenomenology worth its salt also recognizes that the phenomenological 
subject actively structures the “concrete physiognomy” of its experience 
(Phenomenology 57). Phenomenology seems, therefore, only to be able to 
make sense of the world as an intentional correlate for a subject, rather than 
the world as it is in-itself. As a phenomenologist, it is claimed, one therefore 
has no means of access to any stipulative world outside of the correlative 
schema. 
There are several strands to the criticism that, in this manner, 
correlationism (and therefore phenomenology) leads to the sort of 
dangerous consequences mentioned at the outset, three of which I will 
examine in turn. 
(a) The Subjectivism Problem 
Since the bounds of the correlation are unbreachable, it seems that 
“[n]othing that is in the correlation can be used to adjudicate differing 
claims about what is outside the correlation” (Richmond 400). Thus, for 
Meillassoux at least, by rejecting the absolutism of the thing-in-itself, 
“correlational reason thereby legitimates all those discourses that claim 
access to an absolute, the only proviso being that nothing in these discourses 
resembles a rational justification of their validity” (Meillassoux 44-5). 
Since correlationism apparently reduces the scope of philosophical 
argumentation about other entities to fideistic belief, correlationism seems 
to result in a sort of radical subjectivism, implicitly stacked in favour of the 
(human) subject, regarding how one should perceive, understand, and treat 
(nonhuman) objects. To clarify: this is not because any belief about a given 
entity can be put to a subjective court of appeal which somehow reasons to 
its ultimate justification, but rather because the fideism that allegedly results 
from correlationism “legitimates de jure every variety whatsoever of belief 
in an absolute, the best as well as the worst” (Meillassoux 46). Thus, 




although the correlationist affirms the fundamental (anthropocentric) 
asymmetry of the epistemic relationship between subject and object, under 
correlationism, any belief that a (human) subject might have about a 
(nonhuman) object is rendered just as legitimate as any other simply in 
virtue of its being believed. 
(b) The Intersubjectivity Problem 
Of course, the above is only part of the story. Correlationists have means 
within the correlation with which to adjudicate truth claims, but only 
through the sort of intersubjective consensus employed by Kant and 
Husserl. One putative problem with such appeals is that since the 
intersubjective community is, in effect, exclusively human, consensus 
entrenches a “species solipsism” (Meillassoux 50) whereby species norms 
usurp the primacy of an (unknowable) reality beyond that community.1 
Similar, if not worse, effects are therefore licensed, since species solipsism 
mistakes the human perspective for reality. Thus, we might plausibly expect 
anthropocentric instrumentalization to follow from correlationism in a 
similar manner to the one that concerned Heidegger about technology (i.e. 
by implicitly characterizing nonhuman entities in terms of their use-value-
for-us, albeit through a disinterested façade).  
(c) The Problem of Human Exceptionalism 
Timothy Morton calls correlationism “anthropocentrism in philosophical 
form” (“Everything” 164) for some of the above reasons, but he also 
contends that the correlationist focus on acts of meaning constitution turns 
us away from concern for the world itself by imposing a mistaken human 
exceptionalism. This problem has two dimensions. In the first place, if 
objects exist only for subjects, and subjects are effectively ubiquitously 
human, then philosophy is purportedly drawn away from concern for “the 
real world” and instead towards description of “my world.” This would 
prove disastrous in terms of a reduced push to address other entities on their 
own terms. These terms, speculative realists claim, cannot be “[p]recisely 
the terms concomitant with the first-person phenomenological point of 
                                                          
1 Husserl holds that the world’s “objectivity” may also be intersubjectively co-constituted 
by trans-species Others (Cartesian Meditations 106-7). Nevertheless, Meillassoux would 
think that, under correlationism, any nonhuman “intersubjective” contributions could only 
be grasped by subsuming them under the narrowly anthropocentric terms of the 
correlationist circle. This is because, Meillassoux claims, transcendental subjectivity is 
confined to a “transparent cage”: the specific, incarnated, “point of view” in which a subject 
is “instantiated” and which exhaustively dictates the terms of any critical enquiry (7; 24-
5). Although we should have misgivings about Meillassoux’s argument, we should note 
that Husserl does sometimes homogenize the “intentional and epistemic essence[s]” of acts 
by which objects are perceived in a manner not obviously sufficiently hospitable to the 
alterity of nonhuman subjects (see, for instance, Logical Investigations II 314-6). 
 




view” (Brassier 27). This allegedly anthropocentric shift also seems to 
speak against taking up the toil of environmental engagement since, as 
Simon James puts it, “[t]o think that mountain streams, humpback whales, 
and Californian redwoods need our care and attention, one must presumably 
see these things … as enjoying some kind of existence in their own right” 
(“Merleau-Ponty” 502).2 
The second aspect of anthropocentric exceptionalism concerns 
turning away from the real things themselves, a move that belies the 
mistaken ontological bifurcation of human subjects and (entities in) nature. 
Here, the sort of subject/object cleavage imposed by correlationism 
allegedly contains, or at least facilitates, a dualistic hierarchy of kind, value, 
and the like. For Morton, this is largely because correlationism cleaves 
human subjects—who retain a constitutive monopoly on epistemological 
and ontological matters—from natural objects, which are plastic insofar as 
they lack any significant resistance to their ontological and epistemological 
subsumption under the interested correlational terms of human subjects. 
Thus, correlationism cannot obviously decentre the human perspective in 
the manner necessary for serious environmental concern.3 
In these ways philosophy, since the second Copernican turn—or 
“Kantian catastrophe” (Meillassoux 124)—appears to have been hopelessly 
and dangerously introverted because, even in acts of radical reflection, it 
cannot escape the “correlationist circle” (Meillassoux 5). In such a circle, 
entities cannot be addressed on their own terms without the caveat “for us.” 
For phenomenologists, this “for us” is explicitly tied to one’s (human) 
intentional horizon. Thus, the anticorrelationist argument goes, because of 
its paradigmatic commitment to correlationism, phenomenology is 
                                                          
2 James associates this sort of argument for metaphysical realism with Holmes Rolston III. 
Rolston makes a similar (though less technical) ancestrality argument to Meillassoux’s by 
referring to the “lion objects” that must temporally precede one’s identification of them as 
such (52-5). Meillassoux’s ancestrality argument holds that phenomenology relies on a 
world that precedes human consciousness because consciousness requires such a world to 
emerge. Phenomenology, however, appears unable to even think about the sort of world it 
requires. Engaging fully with the ancestrality argument goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. I will, however, gesture in the direction of a response via Merleau-Ponty’s 
identification of lateral kinship in section five. 
3 Morton claims that resistance to “Western ideas of the subject as transcendence” requires 
re-construing “everything as objects” (“Everything” 168), as well as recognizing that 
“[t]here is no Nature, only people, some of whom are human beings” (“Ecologocentrism” 
77). Although Morton’s solution to this problem differs radically from Meillassoux’s, the 
basic objection is consistent with Meillassoux’s lament that, through specifically 
correlational subject/object relations, “contemporary philosophers have lost the great 
outdoors, the absolute outside of precritical thinkers: that outside which was not relative 
to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is, existing in 
itself regardless of whether we are thinking it or not; that outside which thought could 
explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory—of being entirely 
elsewhere” (Meillassoux 7). 




problematically incompatible with nonanthropocentric epistemic 
engagement with the more-than-human world.4 
 
II. Why Regard for Alterity Requires Something Like Correlationism 
In order to respond to these charges, I will first discuss how the requirement 
not to overwrite nonhuman alterity, which underwrites all three objections, 
may actually speak in favour of adopting something like a correlationist 
philosophy. 
One plausible place to begin is Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the 
Other. As a matter of inescapable “perceptual faith” (Merleau-Ponty, 
Visible 18), I recognize that the Other opens onto a common world, which 
may nevertheless differ by significant degree from my own (Visible 141). 
There can, however, be no possibility of their perspective presenting itself 
to me without collapsing that alterity. If the Other were “given to me such 
as he is present to himself … the fusion of its ego with mine would cause 
its alterity to disappear” (Barbaras 128). Others, it seems, are given to us 
fundamentally ambiguously: neither as pure positivity (object), nor—given 
the commonality of our world—as pure lack (subject).  
It seems plausible to suggest that if we cannot subsume the Other 
into ourselves via reducing them to an object, then we should be attentive 
to the limits of our own worlds and any “objects” therein. Addressing the 
Other in her alterity in a manner that evades an erroneous ontological and 
epistemological imperialism seems to require that one first recognizes that 
“how the world is for me” cannot be unproblematically universalized. One 
crucial limitation on doing so is that one’s concrete body is a necessary 
condition for having one’s world, because one’s body “opens [one] out upon 
the world and places [one] in a situation there” (Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology 165). 
Merleau-Ponty argues that epistemological and ontological claims 
always rely on the primacy of the phenomenal perspectives in the context 
of which they (via the natural sciences and so on) derive their usefulness 
and truth-value (Phenomenology viii). Merleau-Ponty then argues that 
one’s embodiment contributes the most important co-determinant of the 
way the world is presented, since our expectations of truth or reality are tied 
to our bodily capacities as the medium of having a world in the first place 
(146). “A thing”, Merleau-Ponty argues, is “not actually given in 
                                                          
4 Merleau-Pontian phenomenology adheres to an expressive theory of truth, under which 
an entirely independent thing-in-itself cannot be grasped. This commitment purportedly 
puts Merleau-Ponty in a worse position (strong correlationism) than Kant (weak 
correlationism). Kant at least thinks that the thing-in-itself can be thought, and must exist, 
even if it cannot be known without anthropocentric filtering via the categories (see 
Meillassoux 35). 




perception, it is internally taken up by us, reconstituted and experienced by 
us insofar as it is bound up with a world, the basic structures of which we 
carry with us” (326). One’s primordial relationship with(in) the world is, 
therefore, operatively intentional: one’s embodied expectations co-
determine the meanings that the world expresses via the essential “grip” in 
which “my motor intentions, as they unfold, receive the responses they 
expect from the world. This maximum distinctness in perception and action 
points clearly to a perceptual ground, a basis of my life, a general setting in 
which my body can co-exist with the world” (250).  
Certain of these expectations will be related to human scale, for 
instance, visual and olfactory limitations, and the like. Merleau-Ponty also 
argues, however, that perception is always subject to habitual sediment via 
the “intentional arc” that “projects round us our past, our future, our human 
setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results 
in our being situated in all these respects” (136). Here, knowledge is 
sedimented into habits that normatively “enrich and recast the body 
schema” (153) at the pre-reflective level. Furthermore, as Sara Heinämaa 
argues, for Merleau-Ponty, perception is also the product of the sediment of 
our “intentional ancestors” in the sense that one always takes up “an entire 
tradition of sensing and perceiving” (282), whereby “my body and my 
senses are precisely that familiarity with the world born of habit, that 
implicit or sedimentary body of knowledge” (Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology 238). 
What all of this means is that reality is expressed from within a 
situation, which one cannot plausibly transcend. Even if one were able to 
overcome historico-cultural sediment in order to return to a pre-sedimentary 
situation, that would still be from within the remit of a concrete human 
body, the grounding perceptual norms of which will not straightforwardly 
map onto all biotic entities, let alone allow one to exhaustively express the 
perceiver-independent reality of any putative abiota-in-itself.  
It is not my intention to defend this view in detail here. The salient 
point is that recognition of one’s contribution to the pre-thematic reality that 
underwrites ontological and epistemological claims is given central 
prominence in Merleau-Pontian phenomenology. As a result, for Merleau-
Ponty, philosophy is properly characterised as radical reflection: the 
perpetual process of attempting to slacken one’s “intentional threads” 
(Phenomenology xii) to better appreciate the basic intentional structures that 
one co-constructs with the world. But Merleau-Ponty is also expressly 
concerned with the chiasmic encroachments that radical reflection might 
reveal with other epistemic body-subjects and, consequently, the overlaps 
and inexhaustible differences in the meaningful ways the world might be 




expressed.5 If one’s differential embodiment is as epistemologically pivotal 
as Merleau-Ponty claims, then it stands to reason that one task for radical 
reflection must be to maintain an interrogative focus on uncovering where 
one might (implicitly) overwrite the alterity of other entities via the 
imposition of situated (and sedimented) ways of perceiving as universal 
truth. In doing so, Merleau-Pontian phenomenology may take entirely 
seriously the thought that expressive truth rules out the plausibility of 
exhaustive accounts of (particular elements of) reality by taking to heart 
Levinas’s thought that objectification involves subsuming all truths into 
mine: it is “the reduction of the other to the same” (Levinas, “Infinity” 48). 
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology is, after all, principally defined by its 
hostility to the sort of ontological and epistemological objectification 
criticized by Levinas.6 This enables Merleau-Pontian phenomenologists to 
set out their nonanthropocentric stall. 
Now, given that “man [sic] is in the world, and only in the world 
does he know himself” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology x-xi), there can be 
no coincidental reflective return to the things themselves in Brassier’s 
sense. This seems to make Merleau-Pontian phenomenology correlationist. 
                                                          
5 An optic chiasm is a part of the brain in which one’s optic nerves partially cross. Although 
the nerves are not themselves photosensitive, their crossing-over is essential for binocular 
vision. Merleau-Ponty’s ontological and epistemological chiasms work in much the same 
way: whilst chiasmic poles (e.g. subject-object; self-Other; sentient-sensible) are not 
identical, neither are they entirely distinct, because the ontological fissure that separates 
them is also a (carnal) bond which allows the reciprocal exchange between poles 
constitutive of perceptual expression. For Merleau-Ponty, just as monocular vision is 
abstracted from binocular vision, “subject” and “object” are reflective abstractions from 
their ordinary co-constitutive expressive contexts. For Merleau-Ponty, partial 
encroachment between chiasmic poles, and not their juxtaposition or assimilation, is 
ontologically basic (see Phenomenology 93; Visible 7-9; 123; 148; 225). 
6 To clarify: Levinas (e.g. “Outside” 96-103) holds that, by understanding Others in 
epistemological terms, Merleau-Ponty misses the ethical moment of radical alterity. For 
Levinas, ethical engagement with alterity requires a “nonreciprocal relationship” (Time 83) 
between parties. Levinas’s critique, however, misses the mark on two counts: Firstly, 
Levinas fails to appreciate that for Merleau-Ponty, as ambiguously embodied body-
subjects who share chiasmic openings onto the world, identity and alterity become largely 
matters of degree rather than kind. It is straightforwardly false, therefore, to think that a 
partial epistemic reciprocity entails, or even necessarily seeks, an ethically suspect 
relationship of objectivistic assimilation in the manner Levinas thinks. Secondly, as Jack 
Reynolds (315-7) has argued, Levinas also fails to appreciate that one can elicit from 
Merleau-Ponty’s works a certain ethical salience to the possibility of dialogical reciprocity 
between parties that can only really be facilitated by a degree of epistemic encroachment. 
As Sally Fischer (210-1) puts it, for Merleau-Ponty, “[i]t is not just a matter of simply 
recognising that there is another, with a view different from my own. Rather, ethical 
recognition is a mode of being with another; it demands that the other be listened to as 
another possible perspective while still attempting to maintain the goal of genuine 
reciprocity.… [T]here is an obligation, a pact to keep the communicative process alive.” 
 




What I want to argue here is that if something like correlationism is the price 
to pay for an intrinsic focus on perpetually addressing one’s own imposition 
of ontological and epistemological violence, then we Merleau-Pontians 
should cheerfully accept the charge (or something like it). 
Of course, this may all be too quick. Speculative realists argue that 
they are suitably reflexive about such violence, while also maintaining the 
realism that is seemingly essential to avoiding disastrous environmental 
implications. After all, no speculative realist claims to have unfettered 
access to reality-in-itself. Rather, they claim that reality can be 
(speculatively) known in part. It seems, however, that the brand of realism 
they employ ultimately speaks against their capacity to maintain sufficient 
reflexivity. 
 
III. Correlationism and the Realism/Idealism Binary 
One underlying problem derives from speculative realists mistaking 
phenomenological “correlationism” for an (anthropocentric) absolutizing of 
the subject pole, which is something to be avoided at all costs. In much of 
the speculative realist literature (e.g. Meillassoux 18; Sparrow 26), a binary 
is set up between idealism and realism whereby correlationism—where one 
denies epistemic access to the in-itself—is considered enough to commit 
one to a full-blown metaphysical idealism. Although I have no space to 
discuss it here, this claim is misleading, even when directed at the alleged 
arch-correlationist: Kant. To his credit, however, Harman attempts to 
address this conflation of epistemology with metaphysics head on, so I will 
explore his argument more fully.  
Harman argues that correlationism commits one to a de facto 
metaphysical idealism because correlationism precludes access to the 
world-in-itself and thus entails that the world is treated in an idealistic 
manner by the correlationist. That is, under correlationism, one absolutizes 
the subject pole as a matter of praxis, and this explains why correlationism 
leads to the sort of disastrous consequences outlined at the outset. If one has 
no epistemic access to the glacier in-itself, the argument goes, the glacier is 
effectively reduced to the way it appears to perspectives like mine. Harman, 
therefore, proposes a “litmus test” for idealism: “Of any philosophy we 
encounter, it can be asked whether it has anything to tell us about the impact 
of inanimate objects upon one another, apart from any human awareness of 
this fact” (Guerrilla 42). Answering “no” to this question, Harman thinks, 
“condemn[s] philosophy to operate only as a reflexive meta-critique of the 
conditions of knowledge” (42).  
We might have reservations about much of this argument, but for 
the sake of brevity, I will focus on one response available to the 
phenomenologist. It might be claimed that Merleau-Pontian 




phenomenology can pass Harman’s own test and, therefore, escape the de 
facto idealism levelled against it. It may do so because Merleau-Ponty 
thinks that we only perceive whole “objects” since perspectives licenced by 
other entities themselves form constitutive parts of one’s own perception.  
To explain: Sean Kelly has compellingly argued that for Merleau-
Ponty, one is always implicitly acquainted with positions of optimality that, 
as part of the normative background of perception, direct “my gaze and 
[cause] me to see the object” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 310) as I do. 
In the case of colour perception, for example, one is only ever “objectively” 
party to perspectival instantiations of lighting and particular shades. 
Nevertheless, what one perceives is the constant, real colour, albeit 
differently situated. As Kelly puts it, “I see how the lighting should change 
in order for me to see the colour better” (83). For Merleau-Ponty, these 
optimal norms appear to be understood at the pre-reflective, bodily level 
because “[t]he real colour persists beneath appearances as the background 
persists beneath the figure, not as a seen or thought-of quality, but through 
a non-sensory presence” (Phenomenology 305). 
The optimal point of observation for three-dimensional objects like 
houses, glaciers, and Californian redwoods, however, is one that reveals 
features from all sides and so cannot be even ideally instantiated. 
Nevertheless, it remains “the norm … with respect to which all actual points 
of view are understood” (Kelly 92). This is why Merleau-Ponty 
(in)famously claims that “the house itself is not the house seen from 
nowhere, but the house seen from everywhere” (Phenomenology 69). As 
Kelly points out, Merleau-Ponty cannot thereby mean to refer to how the 
hidden sides would appear if I were to go and look at them, because those 
other perspectives are manifest parts of my current perception (100). This 
claim is exemplified in the following passage: 
To see is to enter a universe of beings which display themselves … 
to look at an object is to inhabit it, and from behind this habitation 
to grasp all things in terms of the aspect which they present to it. But 
insofar as I see those things too, they remain abodes open to my gaze 
and, being potentially lodged in them, I already perceive from 
various angles the central object of my present vision. (Merleau-
Ponty, Phenomenology 68) 
The present perspectives of other entities (in which one is lodged, 
and which are licenced by the object itself) constitute part of the normative 
background to one’s perception because “every object [really] is the mirror 
of all others” (68).7 Thus, one might plausibly claim, Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenology does have something to tell us about inter-objective 
                                                          
7 Making this claim plausible requires an appeal to the ontological continuity that carnality 
provides. I explore this continuity in section five. 




relations without reducing them to one’s own awareness of those relations 
in the manner necessary to implicate one in idealism. 
To clarify: accepting the partiality of situated perspective is the 
starting point of object-oriented ontology. Harman therefore cannot think 
that the mere fact that one’s knowledge of inter-objective encounters is 
always gleaned from a perspectival position of awareness is enough to 
render a philosophy idealist without undermining the realism of his own 
project. Neither can he maintain that idealism is entailed by the mere 
fallibility of knowledge claims made about inter-objective relationships. 
Like Meillassoux, Harman readily accepts the fallibility of speculative 
knowledge claims. In terms of other entities, there needs to be a stronger 
epistemic reduction to, or metaphysical dependence on, human awareness 
to entail de facto idealism. But Merleau-Ponty does not invoke either of 
these relationships.  
Nevertheless, Harman cites the very passage in question as an 
example of Merleau-Ponty’s idealism, calling it “a metaphysics of 
relations” (Guerrilla 50). Harman argues that if an entity is reduced to a 
view-from-everywhere that leaves “nothing hidden,” as Merleau-Ponty 
claims (Phenomenology 79), then the latter is effectively advancing an 
idealist metaphysics (Guerrilla 51). This is because, Harman argues, the 
entities in question are ultimately nothing more than the multiple human 
perspectives in which they feature. After all, Merleau-Ponty does not 
engage in the sort of panpsychist or animist anthropomorphism under which 
glaciers, rocks, and neutrinos really perceive one another in the absence of 
body-subjects.8 A metaphysics of relations, for Harman, is tantamount to 
idealism and is purportedly exemplified by Merleau-Ponty’s consistent 
reduction of the in-itself to an “in-itself-for-us” (Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology 322). Harman goes as far as to claim that Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenology adheres to a pseudo-Kantian metaphysics under which 
reality is “a vast homogenous totality until humans burst onto the scene” 
(Guerrilla 52). If Harman’s critique holds, then Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenology does seem to absolutize the human subject in an 
anthropocentric manner. 
However, Harman misunderstands what Merleau-Ponty means by 
“in-itself-for-us.”9 For Merleau-Ponty, the “inexhaustible” (Phenomenology 
                                                          
8 Even in Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology, the sensible-sentient chiasm is only a 
“remarkable variant” (Visible 136) of fleshy relations. There is no requirement for universal 
sentience. In fact, Merleau-Ponty explicitly rejects it (Visible 39; 136; 250). 
9 We should heed Merleau-Ponty’s warning about linguistic distortion in the terminology 
he employs. For Merleau-Ponty, an entity “is not first of all a meaning for the 
understanding, but a structure accessible to inspection by the body, and if we try to describe 
the real as it appears to us in perceptual experience, we find it overlaid with anthropological 
predicates” (Phenomenology 320). 




xvii) contribution of the world with(in) which I communicate is an essential 
co-determinant of reality that is irreducible to Harman’s idealistic 
characterization. Although the world shows up only in particular 
expressions as integrated, diacritically-interrelated wholes, Merleau-Ponty 
is adamant that the world retains what James calls a “brute presence” that is 
irreducible to acts of perception, which is the very reason why our 
intersubjective world is unavoidably common in the first place (James, 
“Merleau-Ponty” 507; Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 320-4). Thus, 
although the view-from-everywhere provides normative onto-
epistemological guidance, entities are not thereby reduced to the sum of all 
“subjective” perspectives because they co-express themselves in or through 
those perspectives. One might not be able to make sense of a pre-expressive, 
autonomous reality, but reality does not thereby become mine in any 
accurate sense. There is, after all, a meaningful distinction to be made where 
“I cannot say that I see the blue of the sky in the same sense in which I say 
that I understand a book or again in which I decide to devote my life to 
mathematics” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 215). One cannot 
communicate alone. 
However, Harman or Meillassoux might respond that this still 
doesn’t satisfy the more fundamental objection that phenomenology 
remains idealistic insofar as it is incompatible with epistemic access to 
objects, properties, or relations in-themselves. After all, Meillassoux would 
contend, since Merleau-Ponty concedes that the view-from-everywhere can 
be only a “presumptive synthesis” (Phenomenology 90) on the part of the 
body-subject(s), rather than being straightforwardly ontologically manifest, 
Merleau-Pontian phenomenologists remain unable to say anything about the 
perceiver-independent absolute. Other promising examples cited by Kelly, 
such as the one where “the lighting directs my gaze and causes me to see 
the object, so that in a sense it knows and sees the object” (Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology 310), fare little better on this score because, for all its extra-
human normative impetus, if the “view from nowhere … is a contradiction” 
(Phenomenology 67), then “the object” can never be understood entirely 
independently of the gaze in which it manifests itself. 
Whilst these contentions about phenomenology’s inability to access 
epistemically purified things-in-themselves are true as far as they go, they 
serve to highlight the fundamental problem with the charge of idealism: that 
the subject/object cleavage is implicitly taken by speculative realists to be 
ontologically primitive in a manner denied by Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenologists.10 Thus, where one cannot engage with reality-in-itself 
                                                          
10 Shaviro explicitly blames the apparent requirement for correlative mediation on the 
bifurcation of nature into distinct objective and subjective realms (65). However, by 
collapsing the subject/object distinction at the (“objective”) level of the in-itself, Shaviro is 
no less guilty than his speculative colleagues of this very bifurcation.  




(i.e. “objective” reality), one is a\pparently committed to a “subjective” 
prison, under which reality is subsumed into what is narrowly one’s own 
(anthropocentric) perspective. But carnal phenomenologies, which employ 
a doctrine of expressive truth co-constituted by chiasmic entities, simply do 
not conform to this rigid subject/object schema (with its dualistic trappings) 
other than as a reflective abstraction. Furthermore, the main reason 
Merleau-Ponty cautions against “‘objective’ thought” (Phenomenology 71) 
is that, by reifying a purified realm of objects, we lose sight of our important 
contributions to their basic intentional physiognomy. I have suggested that 
it is these very contributions that radical reflection must interrogate if we 
are to resist the erroneous, and potentially dangerous, imposition of 
ontological and epistemological terms.  
In fact, the acquired subject/object schema that underpins 
speculative realist analyses plausibly derives from the primary ambiguity 
experienced by body-subjects, an ambiguity necessitated by taking one’s 
embedded implication in perspectival gestalts seriously. But this ambiguity 
does not make the “subject” the sole motor of truth, and this is where the 
charge of idealism breaks down.11 Merleau-Pontian phenomenologists can, 
and do, take the contributions of other entities seriously on their own terms. 
On my account, at least, they simply recognize that doing so requires radical 
reflexivity to the limitations of one’s perspective and the contributions of 
one’s sedimented history to that perspective. The important fact remains 
that, whilst (as Morton claims) narrowly self-reflexive critique retains a 
crucial role in Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, it surely cannot be the task 
of philosophy because its focus is too narrow. It would recognize only one 
stand of radical reflection (attention to sediment), at the cost of the other 
(attention to the contribution of the world). 
If my analyses in the preceding sections hold, then Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenology need not be guilty of the idealism with which it is charged 
and which (along with the failure of dogmatic metaphysicians to recognize 
their own anthropocentric heritage) provides the impetus for a speculative 
realist turn. If I am right about this, then speculative realists also appear to 
be misled about the (anthropocentric) limitations of phenomenology’s 
scope. What the analyses contained in these sections do, however, is allow 
us to foreground the implicit principles on which speculative realism is built 
and which will ultimately speak against its ability to address more-than-
human entities in their alterity. 
 
                                                          
11 There are clear parallels in objectivistic metaphysical suppositions between the false 
dichotomies of empiricism/intellectualism and realism/idealism. The claim that 
correlationism boils down to subjective mediation of objects appears to attribute a 
misleading sort of representationalism in Merleau-Ponty’s case. 




IV. Tensions Between Anticorrelationist Realism and Alterity 
In addressing the modality of the in-itself, speculative realism’s focus 
subtly, but importantly, shifts away from addressing one’s own limitations 
and towards stipulative transcendental means of access that nullify one’s 
subjective contribution. Even putting aside Merleau-Ponty’s arguments for 
the implausibility of doing so, this shift of focus turns one’s reflective 
attention away from the -centric overwriting of alterity, one of the very 
issues that was to be addressed by speculative realism. Steven Shaviro, for 
example, locates the motor of Kant’s anthropocentrism in his “critical self-
reflexivity”, which should be “dislodged” on the basis that it is “too inward-
looking” (72). What instead tends to happen is that speculative realism is 
drawn towards reflective abstractions. Abstracting in this manner is 
problematic for two reasons: because the further one abstracts from 
grounding perceptual expressions, the risk of reflective distortion increases; 
and because such abstractions are more prone to concealing the contribution 
of the situated body-subject. Here are a few examples from the speculative 
realist literature to illustrate: 
To avoid relying on a phenomenological opening, both Meillassoux 
and Brassier reduce the in-itself to inert matter. They each do so because 
they think that disrupting the correlationist circle requires teasing apart 
subject/thought from object/being. By purifying the in-itself from any 
necessary reliance on (human) thought or subjectivity, they hope to 
speculatively access metaphysically real things-in-themselves on their own 
terms. For Meillassoux, radically decentring thought requires resuscitating 
a neo-Cartesian account of primary qualities under which only “those 
aspects of the object that can be formulated in mathematical terms can be 
meaningfully conceived as properties of the object in itself” (Meillassoux 
3; 115). For Brassier, a significant “gain in intelligibility” comes through 
the realization that being-in-itself is characterized by “the extinction of 
meaning … the cancellation of sense, purpose and possibility” (Brassier 
238). 
As the ecofeminist philosopher Val Plumwood has argued, however, 
these sorts of schematization belie a historically-situated “truncated 
reversal” (121) of the Cartesian schema: a misleading anthropocentric 
metaphysics, minus the mind, under which “objects” are implicitly 
dualistically instrumentalized. Plumwood’s point is that by leaving the 
dogmatic terms of the subject/object dualism unchallenged, a truncated 
reversal strategy is bound to perpetuate anthropocentric instrumentalism 
rather than facilitate an improvement in addressing the world on its own 
terms. It will do so because a truncated reversal retains the hierarchical 
assumption that (material or nonhuman) “objects” differ in kind from 
(human) “subjects” in a manner that legitimates effectively viewing the 
former as a resource (i.e. something that can be more-or-less exhaustively 
appropriated or possessed, both in the epistemic and wider senses of the 




term). At the same time, this reversal leaves human subjects to be the sole 
source of meaning and value. The identities of both relata of the dualism are 
shaped in the historical context of anthropocentric colonialism. Plumwood 
argues, therefore, that simply jettisoning the subject pole will not disrupt the 
residual Cartesian political agenda since—largely because of its sedimented 
metatheoretical assumptions—only a problematically impoverished 
conception of the more-than-human world is left behind (47). 
But Meillassoux’s problems do not end there because his “reversal” 
of the Cartesian schema is not even consistently “truncated.” Shaviro 
suggests that Meillassoux’s problematic human exceptionalism is perhaps 
best seen via his account of the brute emergence of subjectivity with 
humanity (75), a claim that would make thought radically discontinuous 
with the rest of the world (Harman, Meillassoux 59). Nevertheless, in the 
final analysis, Brassier fares little better. Brassier’s exceptionalism comes 
with the nihilism he consistently equates with the absence of human valuers. 
Both dualistically cleave mind/culture/subject from body/Nature/object 
along anthropocentric lines that should trouble Morton as much as 
Plumwood. 
Shaviro attempts to address these issues by rehabilitating a 
“paradoxical” Whiteheadian mode of reflective speculation, which, he 
claims, is our only means of the encountering “the world without us 
obliquely” (66-7). However, in doing so, Shaviro curtails the subject/object 
bifurcation too forcefully and collapses the distinction into a panpsychism 
at the level of the in-itself, under which nonhuman entities are subsumed 
under human categories; most notably universal sentience. Although even 
Merleau-Ponty argues that (non-representational) intentionality extends 
well into the biotic community—at least as far as dung beetles, but probably 
much further (Structure 123)—this only problematizes the body/mind 
binary. Significantly, this means that, contrary to Harman’s assertion 
(Guerrilla 173), Merleau-Pontian Others do not have to be human.12 
However, especially if one is to take seriously the possible heterogeneity of 
mindedness and its intrinsic relation to our concrete modes of embodiment, 
                                                          
12 Merleau-Ponty makes this point repeatedly in The Structure of Behaviour. In its final 
paragraph, Merleau-Ponty argues that it is an objectivistic error to attempt to naturalize a 
nonhuman gestalt from a transcendental view-from-nowhere. This is why the 
Phenomenology is so concerned with human perception—it is a phenomenological 
investigation from within a certain kind of gestalt structure—not because Merleau-Ponty 
abandoned nonhuman intentionality. Harman seems to be unfamiliar with Merleau-Ponty’s 
early work. Acceptance of nonhuman awareness, however, might also allow Merleau-
Pontian phenomenology to pass Harman’s litmus test in another way because it licences 
irreducibly more-than-human expressions of the world.  




Merleau-Ponty’s admission certainly does not entail Shaviro’s claim that 
“intentionality is … an ontological feature of objects in general” (80).13  
To clarify: whilst I applaud Shaviro’s rejection of Meillassoux’s 
assumption that “thought, value, and experience are essentially, or 
exclusively human to begin with” (Shaviro 91), this realization has not led 
Shaviro to problematize the sedimented Cartesian assumptions that 
underpin Meillassoux’s account. Shaviro ultimately admits nonhuman 
entities to the sphere of mindedness not by disrupting the atomistic and 
hierarchical terms of the subject/object dualism, but rather by 
anthropomorphically extending them without reserve. This has the effect 
that, to the extent that Shaviro may address (nonhuman) Others, their 
subjectivity cannot differ from his in any radical manner. Shaviro says as 
much when he claims that “[t]he bat’s inner experience is inaccessible to 
me, but this is so in much the same way … that any other person’s inner 
experience is accessible to me” (92). By making all entities “autonomous 
centers” (89) of life, in possession of remarkably similar atomic 
subjectivities, it seems Shaviro is guilty of what Plumwood calls 
“incorporation”: the colonial (androcentric as well as narrowly 
anthropocentric) act of defining the underside in a manner relative to the 
master identity—in this case, roughly, a Cartesian subject—rather than 
emancipating it in its alterity.14 
As I see it, the underpinning problem with each of these positions is 
that speculative realism’s stipulation that reality cannot be gleaned from 
within the correlation introduces a (false) dilemma: to absolutize the object 
pole (Meillassoux, Brassier) or else collapse the distinction between poles 
at the level of the in-itself (Shaviro). Since both options are, I have 
suggested, plausibly derivative from the phenomenal reality co-expressed 
between chiasmic “world” and “subject” poles, both options erode alterity 
through egomorphic or anthropomorphic imposition. Why? In short, 
because the speculative realist requirement for unmediated access to the in-
itself requires an objectivistic reduction to the same, yet “the same” is 
always gleaned from a situated and partial (if not narrowly singular) grip on 
the world.15 Moreover, by shifting the focus away from critical self-
                                                          
13 Bennett makes a helpful distinction between subjective mentality and quasi-agency. 
Since Shaviro is set against brute emergence, he needs even slime moulds, thermostats, 
and neutrinos to possess the former. Quasi-agency, however, is not so obviously neo-
Cartesian. 
14 Plumwood argues that the atomism invoked from the master perspective, for example, 
is fallacious outside of the logic of dualism. This means that acts of incorporation like 
Shaviro’s are shot through with misleading sediment. 
15 Although I will not explore it in depth here, the object-oriented ontology strand of 
speculative realism is tainted by similar errors because its concessions to alterity are either 
too strong or too weak. Since for object-oriented ontologists, the object itself cannot be 
accessed at all, the strong kind of alterity retained through object withdrawal does nothing 




reflexivity, speculative realists appear to be in a worse position than some 
of their phenomenological rivals to recognize and attend to such problems. 
If I am right about this, then, in lieu of recourse to the sort of radical 
reflection available to Merleau-Pontian phenomenologists, speculative 
realism is in a worse position than Merleau-Pontian phenomenology to 
engage with more-than-human entities in their alterity. 
 
V. So, is Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology Correlationist? 
One important consideration here surrounds any putative realism taken up. 
As has been noted, Merleau-Ponty does retain inescapable categories of 
truth and reality, but these are grounded in perceptual co-expression, rather 
than transcendent acquaintance with a world-in-itself (Phenomenology xvi). 
The mere possibility that a perceptual expression might be subsequently 
shattered and replaced (as happens when we realize a “rock” is really a lump 
of driftwood (Visible 40) does not “amount to sceptical doubt” about the 
world “because, in short, doubt must be lived” (James, Presence 48). Thus, 
the praxis of affirmation and seriousness with which the Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenologist addresses the real world mirrors that of avowed realists.  
One other salient aspect of the Merleau-Pontian account that should 
be emphasized here is that since one is one’s body, one is implicated in the 
world in one’s essential carnality. Merleau-Ponty distinguishes lived-body 
(Leib) from corpse (Körper) but holds that the body’s fundamental (subject-
object) ambiguity shows these to be inseparably intertwined as matters of 
degree (Phenomenology 283). Since one is ontologically “connatural” (217) 
with the rest of the world, therefore, “the whole of nature is the setting of 
our own life, or our interlocutor in a sort of dialogue” (320). The 
relationship articulated here is, James notes, significantly more “intimate” 
than that between subject and object (“Merleau-Ponty” 512). This means 
that, as a Merleau-Pontian body-subject, one does have direct epistemic 
contact with that world in a manner not true of Kant, or perhaps Husserl, 
because one is not bifurcated from that world in the manner that Cartesian 
subject/object dichotomies require.16 Speculative realist analyses, however, 
                                                          
to satisfy the demand to address the more-than-human world in its alterity. Neither is 
alterity given sufficient due with respect to the metaphorizing relations that allegedly take 
place between objects because the terms under which inter-objective encounters play out 
between nonhuman entities are exactly those found in human experience. In Harman’s 
paradigm example, for instance, both the properties with which fire and cotton metaphorize 
one another, and those which withdraw—the cotton’s “aroma” or the fire’s “foreboding 
sparkle” (Harman 170)—are also freely available to us humans.  
16 Perhaps the mistakenly widespread attribution of correlationism is the product of 
grounding a metaphysical movement in a common rejection of Kantian metaphysics. 
Although Kant disavows the experiential uncoupling of concepts and intuitions, he does 




are unsuited to make sense of this fact since their metaphor of “access” 
requires the problematic reification of ontologically distinct poles from the 
outset. 
Furthermore, through one’s embodiment, one should accept 
relations of significant ontological continuity with other animals and, albeit 
to a lesser extent, other (a)biota. Kelly Burns, for example, notes that for 
Merleau-Ponty, “the similarities in the ways that our bodies operate in the 
world lead to similarities in consciousness, which is not an isolated 
phenomenon, but a common experience” (110). For instance, one shares 
significant bodily continuities with certain other mammals, so it is plausible 
that at some ideal, pre-sedimented level, there are common (if gradated and 
heterogeneous) nondiscursive grounds of experience that testify to a shared, 
real world.17 Once one dispenses with the binary requirements of a rigid 
subject/object, or self/other schema, engagement with other entities in their 
alterity becomes feasible on these grounds. 
We may go on: Elizabeth Grosz and Brian Massumi emphasize 
human-nonhuman connaturality through evolutionary continuity. Massumi 
does this by drawing attention to evolutionary “supernormality,” which we 
see in Herring Gull behaviour and which infuses human creativity. Merleau-
Ponty makes a related point by appealing to the chiasmic gestalts of matter, 
life and mind under which something novel (e.g. life, mind) emerges from 
its predecessor (Structure).18 Merleau-Ponty argues that, as embodied, 
“higher” gestalts themselves rely essentially on ever-present but 
subordinated gestalts that condition them. Subordinated levels are 
associated with more rudimentary ways of being-in or revealing the world. 
Yet, as Ted Toadvine argues, through the chiasmic contribution of 
subordinated levels to perceptual grip, we share partial epistemological and 
                                                          
arguably reify the transcendental subject in the manner problematized by speculative 
realism (Kant 193-4 B75/A51).  
17 Under this understanding, discourse “is not what is said; it is that which constrains and 
enables that which can be said. … [Discursive practices] are actually historically situated 
social conditions” (Barad 137). To think of whole experiences as discursive/nondiscursive 
is misleading, because doing so requires the same anthropocentric culture/nature dualism 
we see manifested in objectivistic representationalism. Nevertheless, the term 
“nondiscursive grounds of experience” is not entirely unproblematic as I am using it here. 
The cross-blending of human vision, for example, is uncontroversially nondiscursive under 
these terms, but still particular to a relatively narrow set of organisms. The world’s meaning 
presented through binocular vision, however, remains irreducible to these biologically-
specific grounds. Thus, the radically-reflective body-subject must continue to question to 
what extent any particular nondiscursive grounds afford narrowly species-specific 
expressions. 
18 In the interest of doing justice to alterity, I suggest we resist Merleau-Ponty’s rigid (and 
potentially anthropocentric) taxonomy, which is inessential to the broader claim about 
chiasmic kinship. 




ontological crossover via “lateral kinship” with such entities since we are 
connatural with them (274-5; Merleau-Ponty, Visible 207-8).19 
In another example, Jane Bennett compellingly argues that the 
quasi-agential contribution of ambiguously “other” actants infuses human 
perception. There is, for instance, a relationship between omega fat 
consumption and depression, which colours perceptual norms (Bennett 41). 
Thus, “it is not enough to say we are ‘embodied’. We are rather, an array 
of bodies” (113). If, as Bennett claims, we are (interrelated) assemblages 
like (pretty much) everything else—abiotic entities included—we have 
further reason to believe that there exist some such nondiscursive grounds. 
The above suggests that it is plausible, via the chiasmic 
interrelationship of subject and (other entities in the) world that one is as a 
body-subject, that one will be well-positioned to express to some degree 
how things are for (that element of) the world itself 20 without violating the 
alterity requirement. In short, this is because the anthropocentrism charge 
fails to recognize that as a body-subject, one is not exclusively, nor even 
entirely, “human.” To deny this fact would bifurcate nature and mind in a 
manner that has been compellingly spoken against by speculative realists 
and actually forms part of Morton’s argument against correlationism. Thus, 
we may respond to Meillassoux’s two objections to what phenomenological 
“correlationism” entails: on the subjectivism problem, Meillassoux is 
mistaken because nondiscursive grounds give inescapable bases on which 
to assess truth claims; on the intersubjectivity problem, Meillassoux 
construes intersubjectivity too narrowly. By bifurcating mind and body, 
Meillassoux fails to recognise that one’s body implicates one in the world 
addressed, and Others therein, in an important, if partial, manner.  
We can see, therefore, contra Morton’s charge, that there is a robust 
sense of realism taken up in Merleau-Pontian (eco)phenomenology. While 
                                                          
19 Toadvine uses precisely this defence to respond to Meillassoux’s ancestrality objection. 
If there is no moment of material history entirely alien to one’s perceptual milieu, “there is 
no past which is absolutely past” (Merleau-Ponty, Structure 207). The “elemental” past 
outstrips the emergence of both sentience and consciousness and, therefore, any subsequent 
subject/object schema. The reverberation of the elemental past within one’s grasp on the 
world, therefore, is the condition of personal time; it does not merely occur as an object 
within it. Thus, one has the same ambiguous sort of continuity with the elemental past as 
one does with the perspectives of other animals. As is also the case with other animals, 
ontological continuity means that one need not set the distant past up as a distinct object-
in-itself with which one is (correlatively) hyper-separated. 
20 This thought does not require that each thing has a perspective as in Shaviro’s 
panpsychism. Rather, where something does have a perspective, the radically-reflective 
body-subject may be able to acknowledge that perspective to some (gradated) degree. 
Where something lacks a perspective, by being attentive to shared nondiscursive grounds 
of experience that underpin expressions of the world, the radically-reflective body-subject 
may again glean some degree of insight to other (more-than-human) perspectives of that 
thing. 




phenomenologists can be realists in the sense of seriously addressing a 
concrete reality accessed noninferentially, however, they are unable to 
commit to the definition of realism (i.e. by addressing a metaphysically 
distinct, “objective” thing-in-itself) required by speculative realists. Given 
the potentially significant crossover between ontologies and 
epistemologies, if the dispute about whether Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenology is correlationist turns entirely on a terminological point 
about the definition of “realism,” then the correlationist charge seems to be 
empty, or at least not very serious.  
There is, however, a remaining strand of the correlationist charge 
we have hitherto glossed. Given that Merleau-Ponty refuses to exhaustively 
assimilate “how things are for the world” into “how things are for me,” this 
leaves him open to Meillassoux’s modified correlationist charge, which 
holds that “[w]e can’t know what the reality of the object in itself is because 
we can’t distinguish between properties which are supposed to belong to the 
object and properties belonging to the subjective access to the object” 
(Meillassoux et al 409).21 This claim, in part, I accept. It is exactly this sort 
of issue that necessitates radical reflection in the first place. But given that 
the radically-reflective framework of Merleau-Pontian phenomenology is 
driven by (or is at least amenable to) a desire to understand the more-than-
human world on its own terms, the critically-reflexive outlook this 
admission necessitates seems to be at odds with the detrimental outcomes 
supposedly caused by correlationism. Moreover, to the extent that 
speculative realism is speculative rather than dogmatic, especially given my 
arguments in the second section, neither can speculative realists plausibly 
escape Meillassoux’s modified charge. As I have argued, by drawing our 
attention away from critical self-reflexivity, and therefore overstating the 
surety of our distinctions between “objective” and “subjective” properties, 
speculative realism seems to be at greater risk of instigating and 






                                                          
21 Another way of reading this claim is to focus on the ability to make a distinction between 
properties that are supposed to belong to the object rather than subjective access to that 
object. Read this way, there is a difference between speculative realism and Merleau-
Pontian phenomenology: the former may make determinate (if fallible) claims about which 
properties belong to the object-in-itself, the latter cannot. I have already argued that the 
ability to do so, however, is either unimportant, or rests on metaphysical stipulations that 
are positively detrimental to appreciating the more-than-human world in its alterity.  
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